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How and when issues are elevated onto the political agenda is a perennial question in the study of
public policy. This article considers how moral panics contribute to punctuated equilibrium in public
policy by drawing together broader societal anxieties or fears and thereby precipitating or accelerating
changes in the dominant set of issue frames. In so doing they create opportunities for policy
entrepreneurs to disrupt the existing policy consensus. In a test of this theory, we assess the factors
behind the rise of crime on the policy agenda in Britain between 1960 and 2010. We adopt an
integrative mixed-methods approach, drawing upon a combination of qualitative and quantitative
data. This enables us to analyze the rise of crime as a policy problem, the breakdown of the political-
institutional consensus on crime, the moral panic that followed the murder of the toddler James
Bulger in 1993, the emergence of new issue frames around crime and social/moral decay more
broadly, and how—in combination—these contributed to an escalation of political rhetoric and action
on crime, led by policy entrepreneurs in the Labour and Conservative parties.
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Introduction
How do moral panics around specific events lead to periods of rapid change in
public policy? The processes by which issues are elevated onto the political agenda
is a perennial concern of the study of public policy. Baumgartner and Jones’s (1993,
2009) theory of punctuated equilibrium in public policy contends that policy changes
occur due to the concurrence of a breakdown in an existing policy monopoly and a
change in the policy image (or the “issue frame” or “issue definition”). In this article,
we argue that moral panics are symbolic events or narratives/stories which tap into
much broader societal anxieties or fears, and which thereby impact the set of frames
associated with an issue. The distinguishing—and important—feature of moral
panics is that they are associated with trigger events that are viewed as being symp-
tomatic of a wider condition, malaise, or societal pathology, which alters the framing
of a given issue and prompt demands for policy action. They are thus one of the pro-
cesses by which policy equilibria are subject to rapid and dramatic change, repre-
senting an extreme and distinctive case. Through understanding moral panics, it
becomes possible to understand how patterns of policy change might vary across
issues and contingent upon events.
In Britain, between the election of the Conservative government of Margaret
Thatcher in 1979 and the landslide victory of Tony Blair’s New Labour in 1997, crime
went from being an issue of marginal concern to the public and to government to
being a central focus of the political agenda—subject to extensive policy activity and
intense competition between the main parties. In less than 20 years, attention to this
issue increased dramatically, following a long period of policy stability. The factors
behind the politicization of crime and its increased salience across numerous
advanced democracies have been subject to considerable debate (e.g., Beckett, 1997;
Enns, 2014, 2016; Garland, 2001; Gottschalk, 2006; Miller, 2016). This article explores
how agenda-setting processes account for the rise of crime on the policy agenda in
Britain between 1960 and 2010. Specifically it considers how the punctuation of an
equilibrium in criminal justice policy followed from the confluence of growing social
problems (including rising crime rates), a moral panic over the murder of Liverpool
toddler James Bulger that resonated with a broader shift in the framing of public dis-
order and social decay, a breakdown in the existing policy monopoly over criminal
justice (which previously had kept crime and policing largely off the political
agenda), and the role of policy entrepreneurs in politicizing the issue and shifting
the policy agenda to a new consensus based around punitive rhetoric on sentencing
and antisocial behavior.1
In the remainder of this article, we explain the analytical value of incorporating
moral panics into the theoretical framework of punctuated equilibrium in public pol-
icy, briefly review the state of the art in debates over the politicization of crime and
criminal justice policy, and assess the evidence for a punctuation on the criminal jus-
tice policy agenda in Britain in the mid-1990s. We then deploy an integrative mixed-
methods approach to analyze the breakdown of the political and institutional con-
sensus on crime; the rise of crime as a problem on the political agenda; the emer-
gence of new issue frames around crime and social and moral decay more broadly;
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and how these contributed to an escalation of political rhetoric and legislative action
on crime, driven by policy entrepreneurs in the Labour and Conservative parties.
This approach is designed to reflect causal complexity; first describing the historical
processes using qualitative and quantitative evidence where appropriate, and then
undertaking time series modeling based on measures of each of the theoretical fac-
tors. This departs from previous efforts to account for politicization of crime in Brit-
ain during this period, through combining analysis of institutions, elites, media, and
the mass public.
Theories of Punctuated Equilibrium in Public Policy
The punctuated equilibrium theory of public policy (Baumgartner & Jones, 1993,
2009) seeks to explain the observation that policymaking is often characterized by
extended periods of stasis and equilibrium, but occasionally undergoes large-scale
policy shifts that upset the status quo. This theory was developed in the context
of U.S. politics, where the configuration of checks and balances is associated with
“institutional friction” that induces much policy stability but occasionally contrib-
utes to infrequent but seismic disturbances. It has also been shown to apply to pat-
terns of policymaking attention in a range of advanced democracies (e.g.,
Baumgartner et al., 2009; Breunig, 2006; Chaques-Bonafont, Palau, & Baumgartner,
2015; John & Jennings, 2010). The key components of punctuated equilibrium theory
are (1) policy monopolies as institutional arrangements that maintain stable and
entrenched patterns of decision making around an issue, supported by (2) an estab-
lished issue frame or definition, and (3) positive feedback processes that give rise to
sudden realignments in public policy (i.e., “policy punctuations”)—due to disrup-
tion of those policy monopolies and issue definitions. This theoretical framework
provides important insights into the sometimes unstable dynamics of policy change.
Punctuated equilibrium theory rests upon the idea that much of policymaking is
conducted outside the world of high politics in policy subsystems—that is, institu-
tional arenas with capacity to handle multiple policy issues on a routine basis,
largely out of the limelight of national politics. These subsystems are built around
the parallel processing of information, by communities of experts, bureaucrats, and
interest groups. Policy monopolies are typically buttressed by a supporting core
value or idea—a policy image (also known as an “issue definition”)—which struc-
tures the social and political norms around which policy debates are organized. This
exerts resistance against dramatic changes in policy, encouraging incrementalism,
which is characterized as negative feedback by Baumgartner and Jones (1993). Such
institutional arrangements act to keep policymaking ticking over but not to dramati-
cally alter its course, excluding particular ideas or interests and insulating the system
from shocks. A consequence of this is that substantial pressure for change can build
up before any broad policy consensus is overturned, and an issue becomes the sub-
ject of attention on the macropolitical agenda.
Under conditions of institutional stasis, when policy change occurs it is often
sudden and disproportionate (Jones & Baumgartner, 2005). Shocks to the policy
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system can become self-reinforcing, leading to policy bandwagons, cascades, and
overreactions (Halpin, 2011). Positive feedback processes are thus associated with
large-scale punctuations in policy and reflect the possibility for periods of instability
to occur, associated with the breakdown of an established policy monopoly and
emergence of a new issue definition. Policy entrepreneurs are also a key component
of punctuated equilibrium theory; as actors seeking opportunities to bring about pol-
icy change, who can draw on strategies such as venue shopping (moving decision
making to new institutional arenas) and the reframing of issues to disrupted estab-
lished policy communities.
Moral Panics, Focusing Events, and Policy Change
Studies of agenda setting find that unpredictable “focusing” or “trigger” events
(Birkland, 1997; Cobb & Elder, 1972) can also prompt large and rapid shifts in policy-
making. Such focusing events can initiate positive feedback, propelling issues into
the public and media spotlight, and generating societal demands for government
action. Lodge and Hood’s (2002) characterization of “Pavlovian” policy responses
similarly observes knee-jerk policy reactions during moments of high anxiety, in
their case relating to dangerous dogs. In the context of an underlying problem, such
as rising crime rates or epidemics of drug abuse, high-profile events are capable of
becoming the focus of public anxieties that, in turn, are seized upon by political
entrepreneurs. Focusing events thus directly draw attention to policy problems/haz-
ards, by revealing current or potential future harms.
Moral panics on the other hand do something different. Cohen’s work on “moral
panics” sketches out the role of collective alarm over perceived “folk devils.” Cohen
(1972, p. 28) defines a moral panic as situations where “A condition, episode, person
or group of persons emerges to become defined as a threat to societal values and
interests.” Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke, and Roberts (1978, p. 20, emphasis in
original) offer a further element in their definition, explicitly noting that the response
is disproportionate: “When the official reaction to a person, groups of persons or
series of events is out of all proportion to the actual threat offered.” The concept has
relevance across a broad range of policy domains where a particular group or behav-
ior come to be labeled as deviant, or as posing a threat to the moral order; not just in
relation to crime (such as outbreaks of gun crime or gang violence) but also for
example public health (especially relating to infectious disease), drugs, popular cul-
ture (such as outcries over video games and pop music), migrants, and welfare recip-
ients. As such, a moral panic takes an event or set of processes and sees it, typically,
as representative of not just what it is, also as representative of something else—often
something of which it is not representative. We will argue below that the murder of
a young boy (James Bulger) by two other children came not simply to represent
child-on-child murders (which are very rare) but rather came to represent a crisis
with the moral fabric of British society at that time.
Moral panics typically proceed from and build out of a single focusing or trigger
event. They constitute a form of amplification in which the details of that specific
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event are perceived as being symptomatic of a wider condition, a malaise, or societal
pathology, which needs to be addressed. The moral panic thus takes a singular event
and reads it as symptomatic of a wider societal problem(s) (even if this event is not
representative of that society or the members of it), the identification of which then
reveals the wider prevalence of the pathology that must be addressed. We consider
moral panics a distinctive subset of punctuated equilibrium theory insomuch as they
similarly entail a change in issue frame which gives rise to disruption of the policy
consensus around a given problem; but identify a specific trigger event which acti-
vates or amplifies that issue frame (or frames), thereby initiating the process of posi-
tive feedback leading to policy change. Moral panics are not inconsistent with public
responsiveness to actual policy problems. For example, rising public anxiety about
crime has been shown to be a function of actual crime rates (Enns, 2014; Jennings,
Farrall, Gray, & Hay, 2017; Miller, 2016). They may explain, however, why certain
problems are suddenly elevated onto the policy agenda at particular times, thus con-
tributing to punctuations in public policy. Indeed, the conditions associated with
moral panics may produce even more disproportionate policy responses, due to the
pressure on policymakers. Our argument is therefore that moral panics contribute to
punctuated equilibrium in policy; whereby a specific event contributes to, or reinfor-
ces, change in the dominant set of issue frames on an issue—encapsulating broader
societal anxieties or fears—creating opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to disrupt
the existing policy monopoly. The extent to which such events contribute to policy
change may be contingent upon timing and characteristics of the policy domain in
question. Unlike a focusing event (in which the events are read as being simply an
example of what has gone wrong), moral panics speak to a wider, more inchoate
and hitherto unarticulated set of processes in which the event which triggers the
moral panic may not, per se, be terribly representative of the problems which are
highlighted.
The Emergence of Crime as a Political Issue
There is a substantial and ongoing debate concerning the politicization of crime
and why it emerged as a political issue in the United States as well as in other
advanced democracies. A small number of scholars have argued that crime rates
shape both public attitudes and political responses to crime in the United States (e.g.,
Enns, 2014, 2016; Fortner, 2015; Miller, 2013, 2016; Weaver, 2007), and in the United
Kingdom (e.g., Downes & Morgan, 1997; Jennings et al., 2017; Newburn, 2007). In The
Myth of Mob Rule, Miller (2016) offers rare comparative evidence—from the United
States, United Kingdom, and the Netherlands—on the connection between crime
rates and policy responses. In their work on punctuated equilibrium in policy, Jones
and Baumgartner (2005, pp. 218–22; also Baumgartner, Jones, & Mortensen, 2014) use
criminal justice in the United States as a specific case of positive feedback in policy-
making. Prior to the 1960s, the federal government had been relatively inactive on
crime policy, but a combination of rising crime, public anxiety, increased media cov-
erage, and a series of urban riots led to an escalation of attention from policymakers
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at the national level and a doubling of federal spending on crime and justice in a rela-
tively short period (Baumgartner et al., 2014). Such a view of the politicization of
crime is far from uncontested. Beckett (1997), for example, argues that public support
for punitive policies is weakly related to actual rates of crime. Smith (2004) suggests
that growth of prison populations has less to do with mass opinion or rising crime
rates, and more to do with race, partisan politics, and (gubernatorial) elections. Other
accounts emphasize the role of institutional structures and interest group politics in
expansion of the carceral state (e.g., Gottschalk, 2006, 2008). The degree to which the
punctuated equilibrium theory of policy applies to the case of crime in the United
Kingdom therefore offers an important contribution to these debates.
Punctuated Equilibrium in Criminal Justice Policy in Britain
What evidence is there of punctuated equilibrium in criminal justice policy in
Britain? The rise of crime on the policy agenda has been one of the notable long-term
shifts in the focus of postwar British politics. Prior to the late 1970s, crime rates had
been low and law and order was given relatively little attention by Labour or Con-
servative governments, and a liberal policy consensus had largely remained intact
(Downes & Morgan, 1997). While the parties increasingly competed on the issue in
their election platforms, this was not translated into policy programs in government.
It was only later, during the 1990s, that crime emerged as a prominent issue on the
policy agenda of government. Before proceeding to our analysis of the processes that
gave rise to these trends, it is necessary to assess the evidence for a large-scale shift
(i.e., a “punctuation”) in the policy agenda on criminal justice. Much of recent litera-
ture relating to punctuated equilibrium theory uses stochastic process methods to
analyze aggregate patterns of policy change (see Breunig & Jones, 2011). Our interest,
however, is in identifying a large change in policy attention for a specific issue:
crime. To do this, we use descriptive statistics and graphical illustrations to reveal
how attention of government to the issue has fluctuated over time, and draw on tests
that detect structural breaks in these time series. Our analysis uses data from the UK
Policy Agendas Project (http://www.comparativeagendas.net/uk) regarding atten-
tion of government to the issue of law and order in executive speeches and primary
legislation, focusing on the period since 1960.
Visual inspection of the data provides support for the claim that a major shift in
attention of British government to the issue of law and order occurred during the
early 1990s. The percentage of Acts of Parliament relating primarily to the issue of
crime is plotted in Figure 1. This shows sizable spikes in legislative attention in 1995
and 1997. In terms of major legislation on crime, 1995 was an exceptional year—with
a total of 17 Acts of UK Parliament passed relating to the issue comprising 31 percent
of the government’s legislative agenda, higher than at any other point during the
postwar period. Bridging the Major and Blair governments, 1997 saw even more
laws (21) passed relating to criminal justice (making up some 30 percent of the legis-
lative agenda). There is similar evidence for attention to the issue in the govern-
ment’s annual statement of policy priorities, the Queen’s Speech. The percentage of
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the speech allocated to law and order is plotted in Figure 2. This also reveals that the
year 1995 marked a large increase in government attention to law and order issues,
followed by a further surge in 1999. This period is therefore notable for this level
shift in legislative and executive attention to criminal justice issues. In the period
between 1960 and 1994, British government on average used 6 percent of the Queen’s
Speech for setting out law and order measures. In the period from 1995 onward, it
dedicated 12 percent to it. The period around the mid-1990s therefore appears to
have seen a structural shift in policy activism on the issue of crime under the Major
government, which lasted to around the end of the Blair era (in 2007), where atten-
tion began to subside.
We conduct two additional tests for the presence of structural breaks in the exec-
utive and legislative agenda.2 First, Zivot-Andrews (1992) tests indicate that each of
the series is stationary with a structural break—in 1993 for Acts of Parliament and in
1996 for the Queen’s Speech (see Appendix Table A1 for results). Further, we
Figure 2. Percentage of the Queen’s Speech, Criminal Justice, 1960–2010.
Figure 1. Percentage of Acts of UK Parliament, Criminal Justice, 1960–2010.
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conduct Bayesian change-point analysis to confirm these findings.3 This follows the
approach used by John, Bertelli, Jennings, and Bevan (2013). Notably, using this
method identifies change points in policy attention in the same years—1993 for Acts
of Parliament and 1996 for the Queen’s Speech. Specifically, we find that after 1993
the number of legislative acts on law and order increased by a factor of 1.5 with a
credible 95 percent range of [1.3,1.7], while after 1996 the number of mentions of law
and order in the speech increases by a factor of about 2.4 with a credible 95 percent
range of [1.9,3.1]. Note that as well as these significant increases in the attention of
policymakers to law and order, there was also a noticeable change in the tenor of
Criminal Justice Acts passed after the early 1990s; from this point government legis-
lation became more punitive and also extended the ways in which punitiveness was
“delivered” (see Farrall, Burke, & Hay, 2016).4
Explaining Punctuated Equilibrium in Criminal Justice Policy in Britain
The puzzle of what caused this punctuation in the policy agenda on crime (in
the increase in political attention to the issue and an increase in punitiveness) is the
focus of the remainder of this article. In what follows, we develop the argument that,
in a context of actual rising crime and rising fear of crime, individual high-profile
crimes (in this case the murder of the toddler James Bulger in February 1993) are
capable of becoming the focus of a moral panic—which resonates with a wider set of
issue frames—and that this, in turn, may be seized upon by policy entrepreneurs (in
this case, the Shadow Home Secretary, Tony Blair, and Home Secretary, Michael
Howard). The effect, we argue, is to generate a rhetorical war between the parties
over crime, which then leads to heightened legislative activism, and an attempt to
“outgun” the opposition (producing a cycle of escalating “toughness”). The process
is akin to the formation of a wave, which is likely to build in size and endure for so
long as crime rates continue to rise or remain high as issue salience persists. This, we
argue, accounts for the politicization of British criminal justice policy since the early
1990s. These processes of agenda setting may help explain the cross-national varia-
tion observed by Green (2012) in penal responses to cases of child-on-child homicide.
They also may explain why the issue of crime more widely underwent a sudden
period of expansion on the agenda during the 1990s and 2000s at a time when crime
had started to fall.
Data and Analysis
Based on the theoretical framework outlined earlier, it is possible to assess evi-
dence for the factors that contributed to these punctuations in the criminal justice
policy agenda, that is, considering the contribution of each component of the theories
of punctuated equilibrium (i.e., policy conditions, the policy monopoly, changes in
issue frames) and moral panics (i.e., the trigger event). For this, we adopt an integra-
tive mixed-methods analysis that draws on multiple sources of evidence; and uses
qualitative or quantitative methods depending on what is considered appropriate for
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the object of analysis. For example, to understand the breakdown of the policy
monopoly and the role of policy entrepreneurs, qualitative analysis of policy and
institutions is combined with elite interviews (with three of the four longest serving
Home Secretaries during the period of analysis). To track increased severity of the
policy problem (i.e., crime rates) and its salience to media and the public, quantita-
tive data are presented. Our analysis considers evidence relating to the following fac-
tors: (1) the policy monopoly governing criminal justice (based on qualitative
analysis of policy/institutions and elite interviews), (2) growing social problems and
public concern (depicted using a range of quantitative data), (3) the incidence of a
focusing event and moral panic (undertaking qualitative analysis of the trigger
event), and (4) changes in issue frames (revealed with quantitative data on rhetoric
used in parliamentary debates). We use these findings to inform specification of a
time series model of the criminal justice policy agenda that tests the effect of each of
these factors simultaneously. As such the article offers a novel methodology that has
general applicability for the analysis of policy change.
The Policy Monopoly: The Home Office Liberal Consensus
Our analysis of the policy monopoly on criminal justice relies on a combination
of a review of existing accounts of policy and institutional arrangements during the
period from 1979 to 2015 and a series of interviews with three out of the four longest
serving Home Secretaries of the 1979 to 2010 period who are still alive; Douglas
Hurd (1985–89), Michael Howard (1993–97), and David Blunkett (2001–04). The only
person missing from this group is Jack Straw (1997–2001), while the other long-
serving Home Secretary from 2010 to 2015, Theresa May, is currently prime minister.
See Appendix Table A2 for a full list of Home Secretaries during the period. Elite
interviews such as these are especially useful in providing insights on the role of pol-
icy entrepreneurs and their perceptions of the existing policy monopoly on criminal
justice. More importantly, Hurd, Howard, and Blunkett were critical actors who pre-
sided over most of the major Criminal Justice Acts of the 1980s and 1990s (see Farrall
et al., 2016, p. 221).
In Britain, institutional dominance of criminal justice by the Home Office meant
that a stable set of policymaking arrangements had been in place for an extended
period up until the early 1970s combined with a broad liberal-progressive consensus
among political parties (Downes & Morgan, 1997). Chief among these was the desire
to reduce imprisonment, albeit gradually so as to not worry members of the public
(Faulkner, 2014, p. 88). However, the 1980s saw this established policy start to come
under strain. A number of previously uncontentious Home Office policy goals (such
as the reduction of imprisonment) became vulnerable to challenge due to dramatic
rises in recorded crime rates. For an extended period, the policy goal had been to
keep offenders (especially young offenders) out of prison. The 1969 Children and
Young Persons Act aimed to keep juvenile delinquents out of court, while the 1972
Criminal Justice Act tried to create more imaginative noncustodial sentences for
some offenders (Hall et al., 1978, p. 48). Even during the 1980s the Home Office
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continued to try to avoid the use of prison; both the 1982 and 1988 Criminal Justice
Acts developed criteria which had to be met before custody could be imposed and
created various alternatives to imprisonment (Blackmore, 1989; Thomas, 1989), while
the 1985 Prosecution of Offences Act introduced measures to reduce the numbers of
people remanded to prison (Cavadino & Dignan, 2007, p. 95). The idea that prison
was an expensive way of making offenders worse initially survived as the attention
of the Thatcher governments was focused on the economy, industrial relations, hous-
ing, and social security initiatives (Farrall & Hay, 2010).
Up until the early 1990s, the position of Home Secretary had been held for long
periods by paternalists or non-Thatcherites (such as Willie Whitelaw and Douglas
Hurd, both of whom were to the left of the Conservative party). Leon Brittan (Home
Secretary from June 1983 to September 1985) later fell out with Thatcher, and his
period in office was dominated by the miners’ strike, while David Waddington, Ken-
neth Baker, and Kenneth Clarke all were only in post for short periods. Of these, as
Baker (1993, p. 424) notes, only Waddington shared Thatcher’s support for the rein-
troduction of capital punishment. Consequently, during the 1980s and early 90s,
there was a gap between the rhetoric and the substance of policies on this matter, as
the Home Office pursued relatively liberal policies (at least where the use of prison
was concerned) despite adopting popular punitive rhetoric (Farrall et al., 2016).
In 1991, a further Criminal Justice Act was passed. The thinking behind the Act
had been developed over many years (Windlesham, 1993, pp. 412–14), and it was
viewed by many as a “high water mark” of informed, liberal sentencing policy (Cav-
adino & Dignan, 2007, p. 55). Despite the attempts which had been made to reduce
imprisonment, none had reduced the prison population. While the Court of Appeal
had provided clearer guidance with regards to their desired sentences for particular
crimes along with guidance as to which offences warranted incarceration, there was
little to ensure that the guidelines were adopted (Koffman, 2006). The Carlisle Com-
mittee (which reported in 1988, see Faulkner, 2014, pp. 91–92) advised that changes
would have to be made to avoid further increases in the prison population. The
White Paper which preceded the 1991 Act argued that imprisonment was “an expen-
sive way of making bad people worse” (Koffman, 2006, echoing the sentiments
expressed by Whitelaw and Howell in 1978), and went on to argue that “more
offenders should be punished in the community” (Ashworth, 1992) and that
offenders should not necessarily move “up” the penal ladder (Koffman, 2006). The
approach to sentencing that was adopted was predicated on the idea that custodial
sentences should only be made when no other sentence would suffice (Koffman,
2006). In order to divert people away from prison, community disposals needed to
be made to sound sufficiently tough, and in so doing tough rhetoric was given a
boost. Such rhetoric can be found also in Douglas Hurd’s speech in 1988 to the Con-
servative party conference, where he argued that “. . .the aim is punishment and no
Conservative should ever veer away from the notion of punishment” (quote in May,
1991, p. 174). Indeed, one leading commentator has argued that the intention of intro-
ducing these orders was to demonstrate that alternatives to custodial sentencing
were sufficiently punitive (Newburn, 2003, p. 147). The 1991 Act also introduced sus-
pended sentences, which were less punitive in practice (Cavadino & Dignan, 2007)
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as courts could only impose them if immediate custody would have been justified
and if the suspension of the sentence could “be justified by the exceptional circum-
stances of the case” (Newburn, 2003, p. 171). Therefore, the Act reduced by about
7,000 those in prison (Cavadino & Dignan, 2007, p. 115). But the 1991 Act was to end
in failure; both Ken Clarke and Michael Howard disliked it, and members of the
judiciary spoke out against it (see Faulkner [2006, p. 125], Balen [1994, p. 240], and
Windlesham [1993, pp. 20–21] for more details on the precise nature of their
criticisms, which revolved around the limiting of the powers of sentencers, the use
of “unit fines,” and a survey of 2,000 criminal justice staff conducted by the Home
Office which suggested that groups as diverse as police officers, defense solicitors,
probation officers and prison staff were united in their dislike of the ways in which
the Act operated albeit to differing degrees).
Popular concern about crime—specifically the public’s fear of crime—was sys-
tematically measured for the first time via a new institution, the British Crime Sur-
vey, which was established in 1982. By the early 1990s, crime was recognized by
policymakers to be rising dramatically, and the status quo on imprisonment increas-
ingly came under pressure. It was during this period that there was a break in gov-
ernmental policy on law and order (Farrall, Jackson, & Gray, 2009) and escalation of
political contestation over the issue between the government and opposition (New-
burn, 2007). A rising star of the opposition Labour Party, Tony Blair, was appointed
Shadow Home Secretary in 1992 and very quickly positioned the party as cognizant
of public concern and being “tough on crime,” criticizing the Conservative govern-
ment for failure of both its policies and philosophies (Blair, 1993). Soon after, in May
1993, Michael Howard was made Home Secretary in the Major government, becom-
ing a key policy entrepreneur in the realignment of Home Office policy on imprison-
ment (Jones & Newburn, 2007, p. 148). The goal of reducing imprisonment quickly
came to be questioned by the new Home Secretary. In an interview conducted with
Howard in September 2014 for this study, he recalled that “the first presentation”
given to him by civil servants stressed policy continuity, in the inevitability of rising
crime and the overriding goal of managing public expectations. In another interview,
David Blunkett recollected receiving similar advice from one of his predecessors as
Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins (1974–76). Howard argued that “there was a prevalent
view among the criminal justice establishment which was that you shouldn’t really
send people to prison unless you absolutely have to. And they were reinforced by
the Treasury which didn’t like spending money on prisons.” The institutional con-
sensus, and prevailing set of norms that structured internal policy debates, was
viewed critically by Howard who considered himself to be an outsider to criminal
justice issues and more resistant to conventional wisdom in policy circles on the
inevitability of rising crime rates: “I expect my predecessors were given the same
sort of advice that I’d been given. And I think they were more prepared to go along
with it than I was.” Such comments are revealing of Howard’s rejection of the Home
Office’s institutional view of crime. During Howard’s term of office between 1993
and 1997, the prison population increased by around 40 percent.
Howard’s appointment as Home Secretary in May 1993 therefore represents a
critical moment. An outsider at the Home Office, he had not been indoctrinated into
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the Home Office’s approach to crime (it would always go up) or imprisonment (it
ought to be used as a last resort). In this respect, Howard’s appointment was akin to
the idea of a “critical nomination” (Robinson, 2013; Ruckman, 1993). This break from
the past was commented upon in an interview with one of his predecessors, Douglas
Hurd: “[Howard] hadn’t very much patience with the kind of approach that I fav-
oured and Ken Clarke . . . and Willie Whitelaw favoured.” For the first time, the
Home Office was led by a Home Secretary with strong punitive preferences. From
that point on, with the main parties seeking to present themselves as tough on crime
(Newburn, 2007), the post was held by a succession of Labour Home Secretaries who
sought to extend the general tenor of the approach adopted by Howard. This
marked a significant disjuncture in the previous liberal policy consensus, that is, the
policy monopoly, that had governed criminal justice for decades.
Policy Problems and the Public Agenda: Rising Crime and Public Fear of Crime
It is also possible—alongside this sequence of institutional and policy develop-
ments—to track the rise of crime as a social problem and topic of public concern,
drawing on a range of official statistics and survey data on public attitudes.
Recorded crime rates had risen steadily throughout the 1970s and 1980s. This trend
accelerated in the late 1980s and peaked in 1992. Rising crime was linked to socioeco-
nomic shocks of the period (see Field, 1990; Pyle & Deadman, 1994) as well as to the
heroin epidemic of the 1980s and 1990s (Morgan, 2014). The crime rate for England
and Wales per 1,000 head of population is plotted in Figure 3. The growth of this
social problem had seen the total number of recorded crimes increase from 2.5 mil-
lion in 1979 to 4.5 million in 1990 (an increase of 179 percent). Rises in crime were
repeated across different subsets of crime: over this period the overall recorded crime
rate was highly correlated with rates of property and violent crime (Pearson’s
r5 0.99 and 0.77, respectively). As such, British government faced an upturn in crime
across several areas of offending—even compared to the upward historical trend.
Figure 3. Recorded Crime in England and Wales, 1960–2010.
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Alongside this, other trends pointed toward growing social disorder, such as the rise
in the number of children excluded from school (and hence “at large” in residential
streets and in trouble with the police), which had increased dramatically since the
introduction of school league tables.
Crime gathers its resonance not just from the meaning of the event itself, but
also from wider social changes in society which it comes to symbolize. Throughout
the 1970s, there was a growing awareness by conservative politicians and figure-
heads (such as Mary Whitehouse) of the emergence of such feelings in the minds of
ordinary people. Citizens, it was claimed, believed that crime was a problem, that
they themselves were more at risk than previously, and that these issues reflected
broader changes and threats in society. The label “the fear of crime” was born out of
these observations and slowly emerged as an object of social scientific investigation
against the backdrop of increased governmental interest in law and order (see Lee,
2007). The late 1970s saw crime and public concerns about crime in Britain become
increasingly salient on the societal agenda. This can be seen in public opinion relat-
ing both to the salience of the issue and fear of crime. Figure 4 plots the proportion
of the public naming crime or law and order as the most important problem or issue
facing the country, as measured by the survey organizations Gallup and Ipsos-MORI
between 1960 and 2010. For all of the period up to the 1970s, crime was a nonissue,
only starting to register at all as a subject of public concern during the late 1970s.
This trend went in parallel with the rising rate of recorded crime, and while there
was a peak in the importance of crime to the public around the time of the peak in
crime rates, the issue’s salience continued to rise into the 2000s even after crime rates
started to fall.
Fear of crime follows a similar but somewhat different trend. Figure 5 depicts the
public’s fear of crime measured in the British Crime Survey (using the question “how
safe do you feel walking alone in this area after dark?”). This shows public anxiety at
its peak in 1993, and steadily declining thereafter, suggesting that while crime was
Figure 4. Crime as the “Most Important Problem” or “Most Important Issue,” 1960–2010.
Source: Gallup and Ipsos-MORI, monthly surveys.
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perceived as an important issue facing society people were not necessarily more
afraid of becoming victims themselves. Media interest in crime remained relatively
stable throughout the 1980s but increased substantially during the 1990s and 2000s.
Figure 6 plots the annual percentage of front page stories of The Times relating to law
and order (data from John et al., 2013), which remains relatively flat from 1960, before
a surge in coverage in 1993 (followed by a later surge in 2003–05). Much as Jones and
Baumgartner (2005) observed for the United States in the 1960s, the emergence of a
social problem coincided with growing public andmedia attention to the issue.
Moral Panics and Focusing Events: The Bulger Murder
As we have argued, focusing events can result in breakdowns in existing policy
equilibria on issues. Moral panics, in particular, can lead particular problems or
groups to be defined as a threat to the values or interests of society—and thereby
Figure 5. Fear of Crime (How Safe Do You Feel Walking Alone in This Area After Dark?), 1981–2010.
Figure 6. Percentage of Front Page Stories of The Times Relating to Crime, 1960–2008.
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create pressure for policy change on the basis of new diagnoses and solutions. The
focusing event in this case was the abduction and subsequent murder in February
1993 of the Bootle toddler James Bulger by a pair of 10-year-old boys, Robert Thomp-
son and John Venables. As Hay (1995, p. 199) outlines, this came to act “as a point of
condensation for wider social anxieties.” The Bulger murder precipitated a moral
panic about other aspects of (then) contemporary British society. It received intensive
media coverage, leading to a moral panic focused on child delinquency in which the
media and, increasingly, leading politicians drew links between this single event and
wider perceived trends in family breakdown and child delinquency. As such this
moral panic went beyond simply the murder of a child by two other children; it
spoke to a wider set of concerns about the decay of inner cities, the rise of single
parents, “feral” boys who were truanting or who had been excluded from school,
industrial decline, loss of respect for “traditional values,” and “dependency” culture.
The killers of Bulger were playing truant from school on the day of the abduction,
and had shoplifted earlier in the day. At least one of the boys was from a single par-
ent family. Both lived in deprived areas of Liverpool. The media linked the murder
to the children having watched a “video nasty,” Child’s Play 3 (though this claim was
never proven). In this context, the child killers were presented as exemplars of the
breakdown of family values, and as the product of “broken homes.”5 As such, the
murder acted as a focal event for anxiety over a set of other social processes which
had been building up in many of the more impoverished parts of UK cities and
larger towns, whereby young children (often boys) were regularly truanting from
school or had been permanently excluded from school, where families were under
stresses (such as divorce or separation) caused by unemployment and underemploy-
ment, where families were increasingly headed by single parents (often females with
lower levels of pay from work, if they did work), and where increasingly local coun-
cils were legally obliged to house those people with high and chronic levels of social
and economic needs.6 In this way, the Bulger murder was rarely, if ever, constructed
as a sign of the danger of children for children (for such cases are very rare); rather it
was constructed as being about a far wider set of processes associated with rapid
economic and societal changes.
Themurder also changedwidespread attitudes toward the ways in which the Brit-
ish thought about crime andpunishment. Since 1986, the British Social Attitudes Survey
has asked respondents to state the extent to which they agreed with a statement about
the death penalty being appropriate for some crimes. In 1987, 43 percent strongly
agreedwith this statement; by 1991 this had fallen to 25 percent. In the immediate after-
math of the murder (the survey fieldwork in 1993 was conducted in the midst of the
moral panic we outline here), the number strongly agreeing had jumped back up (to 45
percent). After 1993, public support for the death penalty resumed its decline, falling
year-on-year. It was, however, not until 2001, some 18 years later, that support for the
death penalty reached its pre-Bulger level (with 24 percent strongly agreeing). Simi-
larly, public concern about crime—measured with the most important problem/issue
(as shown in Figure 4)—had been falling steadily in the period between 1988 and 1992,
but rose sharply in 1993 (with surveys in the month immediately following the killing
revealing a doubling in the percentage of respondents naming the issue).
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Issue Frames: Trends in Parliamentary Issue Definitions Regarding Crime and Society
The moral panic around the Bulger murder can be linked to a wider shift in the
prevalent issue frames in political debate around crime and social problems. Political
rhetoric around “broken homes,” “single mothers,” and other areas of perceived social
and moral decay had been circulating well before, but the immediate aftermath of the
murder saw a substantial spike in many associated issue frames. Figure 7 plots the
number of references in parliamentary debates to key terms over the period from 1960
to 2004. The political salience of this focusing event can be seen both in the amount of
attention it received at the time and in its frequent reappearance on the parliamentary
agenda over subsequent years. Its impact on wider political debate can be observed in
the spikes in discussion of juvenile and youth crime around this period, along with the
longer term emergence and rise of the discourse of “antisocial behavior” from the
mid-1990s onward. Notably, many issue frames associated with broader social anxi-
eties—such as “single mothers,” “truancy” (or truants), “broken homes,” and
“yobs”—also became more prevalent in parliamentary rhetoric. Mentions of juvenile
and youth crime, truancy, and single mothers all spiked in 1993 specifically. These were
followed by the later wave of political concern with antisocial behavior (which by the
early 2000s was receiving about as much attention as all other issue frames put
together). On this basis, it is evident that the killing, although not the cause, resonated
with these undercurrents of anxiety about social and moral decay—in which there
was an implicit link between social breakdown and rising crime. Such concerns were
starting to register in mass opinion. Data from the British Social Attitudes Survey
Figure 7. Number of Mentions of Issue Frames in Parliamentary Questions, 1960–2004.
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suggest that, from the mid-1990s, there was a growing perception that young people
lacked respect for “traditional values” (see Supporting Information Figure S1). Not
only had crime started to receive more attention from British government, the related
set of issue frames had become tied to anxiety about social breakdown, or “the causes
of crime” as Tony Blair had labeled it.
Summary
To what extent do theories of punctuated equilibrium and moral panics account
for the case of criminal justice policy in Britain? It is clear that the 1990s observed the
breakdown of the policy monopoly that had overseen relative stability in criminal
justice policy for several decades—the liberal consensus within the Home Office
resistant to pressures for more punitive measures. Prior to that point, British govern-
ment had been relatively inactive on criminal justice, but the combination of rising
crime rates and related social problems, public concern about crime and disorder,
increased media coverage and competition between policy entrepreneurs (Howard
and Blair) looking to gain political ownership of the issue, led to an escalation of
attention from government. As part of these dynamics, the sudden and large shift in
policy attention was fueled by a single shocking event—the murder of James
Bulger—and a change in the related set of issue frames around criminal justice, as
crime became increasingly linked with a sense of social and moral decay.
While the Bulger murder in itself was a shocking event that led to societal anxiety
around social breakdown and crime, the issue expansion around criminal justice pol-
icy during this period was heavily influenced by the role of policy entrepreneurs. As
we noted earlier, policy entrepreneurs are a key component of punctuated equilibrium
theory; as actors seeking opportunities to disrupt the status quo and gain political
advantage. While Michael Howard was a critical actor, as we have argued, in oversee-
ing a break with the liberal policy consensus that had governed the Home Office for
decades, Tony Blair as Labour’s ShadowHome Secretary (and later as Prime Minister)
also played a key role in escalating political rhetoric and policy activism. Blair’s
response to the Bulger murder was a significant moment in his eventual ascension to
the Labour leadership (the next year in 1994), with a widely publicized speech that
described news reports of the murder as “hammer blows struck against the sleeping
conscience of the country.” Writing later, Blair (2010, p. 57) explained “Very effectively
I made it into a symbol of Tory Britain in which . . . the bonds of social and community
well-being had been loosed, dangerously so.” Blair thus connected the growing social
anxiety around crime to a diagnosis of social breakdown and rebranded the Labour
Party’s reputation on law and order, famously invoking the slogan “tough on crime,
tough on the causes of crime,” challenging the claim of the Conservatives to be the nat-
ural party of law and order. This politicization of criminal justice led to a process of
issue expansion as government measures became increasingly punitive in both rhe-
toric and substantively in terms of legislation—first under Michael Howard and then
under a series of Labour Home Secretaries. The stalemate had been broken.
The substantial shift observed in the policy agenda in such a short time period is
consistent with a process of positive feedback—as the confluence of a growing social
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problem, public concern, media attention, and escalating rhetoric by entrepreneurial
politicians pushed criminal justice out of subsystem politics and onto the national polit-
ical agenda, leading to heightened political activity on the issue. It is clear too that the
Bulger killing was a focusing event that crystallized a series of anxieties and frames of
social andmoral breakdown, leading to a shift in framing of criminal justice as an issue
and the sorts of policy responses that were palatable to policymakers. The upsurge in
government attention following the rise in crime rates and increased public and media
interest has clear parallels with the punctuation in attention to criminal justice that
occurred in theUnited States in the 1960s and 1970s (Jones& Baumgartner, 2005).
Time Series Analysis of the Criminal Justice Policy Agenda
The final step of our integrative mixed-methods approach is to use these find-
ings to inform specification of a time series regression model of the criminal justice
policy agenda. This enables us to test the simultaneous effects of each of the factors
identified as contributing to the emergence of crime as an issue on the policy agenda,
having earlier identified the specific break points in the policy agenda. Where possi-
ble we draw on time series measures of each of the factors considered above: (1) the
policy monopoly (where a variable is included for party control of government), (2)
policy conditions (violent crime rates) and the wider societal agenda (public and
media attention to the issue and public preferences for punitive policy), (3) the focus-
ing event (measured with mentions of the Bulger case in parliamentary debates),
and (4) the wider set of issue frames prevalent in political debate (also measured
from parliamentary debates). Our dependent variables are the executive and legisla-
tive agendas on criminal justice, measured using the percentage of the Queen’s
Speech and Acts of UK Parliament relating to the issue in a given year. The time
frame of our analysis is constrained to the period between 1960 and 2004 by data
availability (i.e., our measure of media coverage starts in 1960 and our measure of
issue frames in parliamentary debates ends in 2004).
Prior to modeling, it is important to determine the order of integration of our
variables. We use the Phillips and Perron (1988) test for presence of unit root (see
Appendix Table A3). The test-statistics indicate that the executive and legislative
agenda and parliamentary attention to the Bulger case are stationary, I(0), processes,
while crime rates, media coverage, issue frames, and the public’s preference for
punitive policy are integrated, I(1), processes. Additionally, the public agenda is
found to be trend stationary. In order to ensure equation balance and model the vari-
ables in the same form (Lebo & Grant, 2016), we detrend the public agenda and use
the first difference (i.e., change) of all the integrated series. As we noted earlier, both
the executive and legislative agenda series are stationary with a structural break. In
normal circumstances, one would want to transform the series to remove the break
for the time series regressions, but since our aim is to explain what contributes to
change in the policy agenda during this specific period, we model the untransformed
series. This enables us to test what contributed to the sudden increase of attention of
policymakers to criminal justice in 1993 and 1996.
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We also use Granger causation tests to determine the temporal ordering of varia-
bles, that is, to assess whether past values of the policy agenda are predictive of the
media and public agenda, or vice versa (see Supporting Information Table S1). These
confirm that the policy agenda does not shape the public or media agenda, and thus
that our models are appropriately specified with it as dependent variable.
We therefore model the executive and legislative agenda as a function of the
effect of (detrended) public attention to the issue of crime MIP0t
 
, change in media
coverage (DMEDIAt), change in the frequency of parliamentary questions relating to
antisocial behavior and social breakdown (DFRAMESt), and parliamentary references
to the Bulger case (BULGERt) as well as change in the rate of violent crime
(DCRIMEt) and a control for Conservative party control of government (equal to 1
when the Conservatives are in office, and equal to 0 otherwise). We also include
interactions of the public agenda with the crime rate (MIP0t 3 DCRIMEt) and with
media attention (MIP0t 3 DMEDIAt). Our expectation is that the effect of public con-
cern will be higher when amplified by high rates of crime and effects of media cover-













The results are reported in Table 1. These provide broad support for our theoretical
expectations, revealing positive effects of the violent crime rate (holding the interac-
tions to zero) and the Bulger killing on the executive agenda, and of interactions of
Table 1. Time Series Regression of the Criminal Justice Policy Agenda







MIP0t 3 DMEDIAt 0.191 20.044
(0.093)* (0.148)











Adjusted R-squared 0.55 0.16
Durbin-Watson statistic 2.221 1.574
Start 1960 1960
End 2004 2004
1p< 0.1; *p< 0.05; **p< 0.01; ***p< 0.001.
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public concern with the crime rate and with media coverage. The results are far
weaker for the legislative agenda, though the effects are signed in the expected direc-
tion for the public agenda, media coverage, issue frames and the Bulger case—but
are not significant at the 95 percent confidence level. Nevertheless, the size of effect
of each parliamentary reference to the Bulger murder is noteworthy, being associated
with just over a 0.25 point increase in the percentage of the policy agenda assigned
to criminal justice in a given year. This suggests that the moral panic surrounding
the killing was associated with an upturn in the attention of policymakers to the
issue.
In order to consider the effect of constitutive terms of the multiplicative interac-
tions (i.e., the public agenda, media coverage, and violent crime rates), it is necessary
to calculate their conditional marginal effects. In particular we focus on how crime
rates mediate the effect of public opinion, and how public opinion mediates the
effect of media coverage. Figure 8a depicts the marginal effect of the public agenda
(on the y axis) on the executive agenda (the Queen’s Speech) at different levels of
change in the violent crime rate (on the x axis). This reveals that the effect of the pub-
lic agenda on the policy agenda is greater at higher rates of (rising) crime. Figure 8b
plots the marginal effect of media coverage on the executive agenda at different lev-
els of public attention to the issue of crime. This indicates that media have a greater
impact on the policy agenda when the issue is also salient to the public.
Together these results offer support for the mechanisms underlying the rise of
crime on the policy agenda in Britain; indicating that the level of public concern
(which reached the levels which one might reasonably refer to as a moral panic),
media coverage, violent crime rates, and a focusing event (the Bulger killing) contrib-
uted to dynamics of government attention to crime. The finding of significant inter-
actions among crime, public opinion, and media are further consistent with the idea
of positive feedback—as these factors serve to amplify one another.
Conclusion
This article has sought to explain why crime went from being a peripheral issue
on the agenda of British politics to being a major concern for the mass public, media,
and policymakers in a short period of time. This seismic shift in political attention,
following an extended period of stability in criminal justice policy, is consistent with
the argument that moral panics contribute to punctuated equilibrium in public pol-
icy—as high-profile events become a focus of public anxieties and lead to the fram-
ing of particular conditions, episodes, persons, or groups as a threat to societal
values or interests. In this case, the policy change on criminal justice was a response
to the problem of rising crime and other forms of social disorder (e.g., truancy), a
particularly shocking crime—the murder of James Bulger—which resonated with a
wider political mood that all was not well in British society, the disruption of the pol-
icy monopoly that existed within the Home Office (which had previously kept crime
and policing off the agenda and had tended to promote a liberal position on punish-
ment) and the key role of new Home Secretary, Michael Howard, and the Shadow
Home Secretary, Tony Blair, as policy entrepreneurs who increasingly politicized the
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issue and moved the policy agenda to a new consensus based around punitive rhe-
toric on sentencing and antisocial behavior.
Our integrative mixed-methods approach has enabled us to explore the political
and institutional conditions that existed prior to the punctuation in the criminal jus-
tice agenda that occurred in the 1990s. Specifically, the material from elite interviews
has offered insights into the prevalent policy mind-set of the criminal justice estab-
lishment that existed within the Home Office, while survey data enables us to track
the rise and fall of crime as an issue of concern to the mass public, and data on the
policy content of the executive and legislative agenda facilitates systematic measure-
ment of the degree to which policymakers were attending to crime. Likewise the use
of data on parliamentary rhetoric offers insights into the emergence of a discourse
around social decay and disorder, on the political agenda at least. Finally, by testing
Figure 8. (a) Marginal Effects of the Public Agenda for Values of Change in the Violent Crime Rate.
(b) Marginal Effects of Media Coverage for Values of the Public Agenda.
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the simultaneous effects of each of the factors (where possible) using time series anal-
ysis—and the interactions between them in some cases—it is possible to determine
whether these findings are sustained within a dynamic model of the policy agenda
at the aggregate level. We believe that this methodology has general applicability for
the analysis of policy change, across a multitude of theoretical frameworks and pol-
icy domains.
Our study points to important directions for future investigation. First, it high-
lights the importance of an agenda-setting perspective in understanding the politics
of crime and punishment in Britain and elsewhere. Second, it demonstrates the
added theoretical and empirical value of combining insights from punctuated equi-
librium theory with the concept of moral panics, as a particular type of symbolic
event or narrative/story that encapsulates broader societal anxieties or fears, and
which lead to reframing of issues in line with much wider sets of concerns. This may
help explain periods of rapid and dramatic change in policy equilibria, in criminal
justice as in other policy domains. Third, it points to the importance of the rise of
issue frames relating to social decay and disorder that substantially influenced Brit-
ish government and wider political debate around criminal justice for much of the
1990s and 2000s. This may help explain why the issue of crime underwent a sudden
expansion as a focus of British politics during the 1990s and 2000s at a time when
crime had started to fall.
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1. It is hard to overstate the cultural importance of the murder of James Bulger. Newspaper headlines in
the United Kingdomwere dominated by the murder, the search for the perpetrators and then, months
later, the trial and sentencing of those found guilty. Magazines which would not normally carry
articles on either crime or the state of British society (such as Good Housekeeping) ran articles on exactly
this topic. Themurder changed theways inwhich the country thought of itself (see Green, 2012).
2. Note that these tests refer to the period between 1960 and 2004 in order to ensure consistency with the
time series regression analyses presented later in the article.
3. To detect the change-point parameter in the policy agenda, we apply the following Bayesian model
with noninformative priors:
countsi Poisson(l1), if yeari< cp




4. Prior to 1993, Criminal Justice Acts going back several decades had contained various measures which
were aimed at reducing the punitiveness of the criminal justice system. Hence, a desire to reduce the
use of imprisonment (including for those on remand) can be found in the 1982, 1988, and 1991 Criminal
Justice Acts and the 1985 Prosecution of Offenders Act.
5. Much of the relevance around the Bulger case tapped into a perceived loss of social control and social
bonds in Liverpool. Additionally, legally this case was treated uniquely—which exacerbated/facili-
tated the hysteria around it from various quarters.
6. Such is the potency of the case that the killers are subject to occasional media reporting, despite ano-
nymity granted to them upon release.
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Table A1. Zivot-Andrews Test for Unit Root Allowing for a Structural Break
Queen’s Speech (%) Acts of Parliament (%)
Structural break 1996 1993




Note: Maximum lag set at 3 years.
**p 0.01.
















Note: *, Interviewed; 1, Deceased.
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